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The “Narrow Road” and the Ethics of Language Use in the Iliad and Odyssey
David F. Elmer
(Published in Ramus 44.1/2 [2015], 155-83.)
I  begin  this  exploration  of  characteristically  Iliadic  and  Odyssean  attitudes  toward  the
traditional language in which these poems are composed by treading again a well-rutted path
in the field of mid-20th century Homeric studies. In formulating his radical revision of the
aesthetics of Homeric poetry, Milman Parry took as one of his guiding principles Heinrich
Düntzer’s notion of a contradiction between the compositional utility of the fixed epithet and
its semantic value: if an epithet could be shown to have been selected on the basis of its utility
in versification—and Parry’s detailed examinations of extensive and economical systems of
noun-epithet  formulae  were  aimed  in  part  at  demonstrating  this  point—then it  would  be
proven by that very fact that the epithet’s meaning was irrelevant to its selection.1 Moreover,
Parry asserted that the success of poetry composed in such a manner would depend on a
corresponding indifference on the part of the audience, an indifference that must be, by his
reasoning, categorical and absolute.2
Perhaps  no  element  of  Parry’s  argumentation  encountered  so  much  resistance  as  this
insistence  on  an  absolute  insensitivity  to  the  relation  between  the  fixed  epithet  and  its
immediate context. It is in fact difficult to imagine that a verbal art of any kind could prove so
insensible to its raw material. Accordingly, there has been no shortage of attempts since Parry
to establish the meaningfulness of Homeric epithets, both in themselves and in relation to
their contexts.3 The most successful of these attempts confront head-on the compositional
factors at  the center of Parry’s analysis. Gregory Machacek, for example, points out that,
1 . See M. Parry (1971), 124-26, with reference to Düntzer (1872). Parry’s other purpose in 
describing formulaic systems was to demonstrate that these systems must be traditional. 
2 . Cf. M. Parry (1971), 141: ‘The truth is that the proofs already given do not allow of any 
exceptions. They all bear witness to so strong, and so habitual, an indifference in Homer’s 
audience to any possible particularized meaning [of the “ornamental” or “fixed” epithet] that 
it could not be overcome, no matter how perfectly matched the idea of the epithet and the 
meaning of the sentence’. These remarks pertain strictly to the ‘ornamental’ or ‘fixed’ epithet.
Parry recognized also the possibility of a ‘particularized’ epithet, but he maintained that an 
epithet must always be one or the other, and that the distinction, which may be unclear to the 
modern reader, would have been immediately clear to an ancient audience (M. Parry [1971], 
156).
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while the choice of a given noun-epithet formula appears,  from one point  of view, to be
determined strictly by the metrical position it occupies, one must always keep in mind that the
traditional  poet  is  not  simply  confronted  by  a  sequence  of  metrical  sedes  that  present
themselves  independently  of  his  design;  through  the  selection  of  alternative  phrases,  he
controls  where  metrical  units  begin  and  end.4 The  poet  thus  has  the  ability  to  choose  a
particular formula by selecting others to accommodate it. Machacek goes on to describe a
number of instances in which particular formulas appear to have been selected (or avoided) in
order to create a particular effect in context. Nevertheless, he notes, ‘in order to facilitate just
a single phrase appropriate to the context in which it appears, the poet might have to sing
several  lines  in  which  he  uses  formulas  precisely as  Parry argued they are always used:
without regard to immediate context’.5 And, while the poet thereby gains a degree of freedom,
‘it must be admitted that that freedom is fairly limited’.6
There are, of course, a number of cases in which we observe in the Homeric poems epithets
so at  odds with their contexts that every critic must accept a certain degree of contextual
indifference. Frederick Combellack cited as examples garments that are                (‘brilliant’)
even when they are  in  need of  washing (Od. 6.74),  and the  description  of  Aphrodite  as
                       (‘laughter-loving’) even at a moment of distress (Il. 5.375).7 Parry, following
Düntzer,  drew attention to such examples,  but  in explaining the manner in which even a
modern  reader  ‘acquires  an  insensibility  to  any  possible  particularized  meaning  of  the
epithet’, he stressed much more the many cases—by far the majority—in which the epithet
simply has no discernible relation to its context.8 It is interesting that Parry speaks here of a
reader’s understanding: it may be that at this stage in his research his thinking was still too
3 . See, e.g., Vivante (1982) and Sale (1996), who argue that the epithets are meaningful, 
albeit used most often without any regard for context; and Austin (1975), 11-80, and Sacks 
(1989), who argue for various kinds of context-sensitivity. Whallon (1961) seeks to 
demonstrate for various epithets either a general or contextual relevance. More recently, see 
the discussion of Friedrich (2007), 83-128. 
4 . Machacek (1994). See also Visser (1988) and Bakker and Fabbricotti (1991), who stress 
the flexibility in versification provided by metrically variable ‘peripheral’ elements.
5 . Machacek (1994), 329.
6 . Machacek (1994), 333.
7 . Combellack (1982), 361. 
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much shaped by his experience of Homeric poetry as a written text. One may easily enough
imagine how a performer might impress upon his audience the meaningfulness of an epithet
they  might  otherwise  be  inclined  to  understand  as  merely  ‘ornamental’.  He  might,  for
example, use some special intonation, or manipulation of rhythm or melody, to lay added
stress on a word.9 Albert Lord—who, unlike Parry, was able to make full use of the results of
their fieldwork in the former Yugoslavia—recognized that the singers he encountered insisted
on the meaningfulness of the epithets they used. He reconciled Parry’s notion of indifference
with the singers’ commitment to the meaningfulness of their language as follows10: 
I am sure that the essential idea of the formula is what is in the mind of the singer,
almost as a reflex action in rapid composition, as he makes his song. Hence it could, I
believe, be truly stated that the formula not only is stripped to its essential idea in the
mind of the composing singer, but also is denied some of the possibilities of aesthetic
reference in context. . . . Nevertheless, the tradition, what we might term the intuitions
of singers as a group and as individuals who are preserving the inherited stories from the
past—the tradition cannot be said to ignore the epithet, to consider it as mere decoration
or  even to  consider  it  as  mere  metrical  convenience.  The tradition  feels  a  sense  of
meaning in the epithet, and thus a special meaning is imparted to the noun and to the
formula.  Of course every adjective and epithet  can be said to do this,  but  I  am not
thinking in this case about the surface denotative meaning of the adjective, but rather of
the traditional  meaning, and I  would even prefer to  call  it  the traditionally intuitive
meaning.
Lord’s ‘traditionally intuitive meaning’ is very close to what John Miles Foley referred to as
the ‘immanence’ of  traditional  poetry.11 It  could be said that  this  kind of meaning is  the
necessary guarantee that allows the epithet to be used in a wide variety of contexts, sometimes
in apparent contradiction with its denotative meaning. On this view, the epithet is a kind of
currency, a token that is able to circulate widely and serve in a variety of contexts because its
value is guaranteed by the system as a whole.
Studies demonstrating a significant relationship between some Homeric epithets and their
contexts, of which Machacek’s is an excellent example, indicate that the traditional language
8 . M. Parry (1971), 126-27 (quotation from p. 127); discussion of ‘illogical’ epithets 
(generally explained by Alexandrian critics in terms of the referent’s qualities ‘in general’ 
[              ] or ‘by nature’ [          ] rather than on that particular occasion) on pp. 120-24.
9 . For a discussion of ways in which intonation and manipulation of melody and rhythm can 
contribute to the meaning of performed poetry (in this case, a Bosniac epic song), see 
Bonifazi and Elmer (2012).
10 . Lord (2000 [1960]), 65-66.
11 . See Foley (1991).
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of  Homeric  poetry  can  at  times  exhibit  a  meaningfulness  that  exceeds  even  Lord’s
‘traditionally intuitive meaning’. Such pregnant uses of epithets have the effect of reasserting
the fundamental appropriateness of their denotations. To continue the currency metaphor, it is
as if the value of the word in question were being confirmed by a reminder that the epithet can
ultimately be redeemed for its full semantic content. In a few instances, we also observe the
reverse procedure: the meaningfulness of an epithet is underscored by drawing attention to an
apparent contradiction between its meaning and the context of its use or potential use. An
example occurs in Book 18 of the  Iliad. Hektor notes that certain epithets of Troy are no
longer applicable in the present circumstances:
                                                                                 
                                                                           ·
                                                                        ,  
                                                                           
                               ’          ,                                             .
(Il. 18.288-292)
Before, all mortal men used to call Priam’s city
‘rich-in-gold, rich-in-bronze’;
but now the beautiful riches of her households have perished,
and many possessions to Phrygia and lovely Maionia
go to be sold, ever since Zeus became hostile.
The phrase singled out by Hektor, the formula                                          ,  is not used of Troy
elsewhere in our Iliad. We have no way of knowing whether epic poems unknown to us did in
fact  use  the  phrase  in  reference  to  Troy,  but  Hektor  represents  the  formula  as  being  a
traditional way of describing the city (note the iterative imperfect                     ).12 His point is
that  present  circumstances  have rendered  these  epithets  inappropriate—but  not,  therefore,
invalid or meaningless. On the contrary, from his point of view, Troy’s present situation is an
anomaly, an aberration. The inapplicability of these epithets, which designate Troy’s essence
(Troy is not Troy without its fabled wealth), is an index of how far out of control things have
12 . The formula occurs only one other time in the Homeric poems: at Il. 10.315 it refers 
(in the nominative) to the Trojan Dolon, whose encounter with Odysseus and Diomedes I 
discuss below. West (1988), 156, notes that the asyndetic pairing of compound adjectives 
with the same initial element is a very ancient poetic device (for similar examples in Homer, 
see Il. 5.613 and 9.154 [=9.296]). It is conceivable that Hektor’s remark draws attention to a 
divergence between the way Troy is described in the Iliad and the way the city was described 
in other traditions.
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gotten. Hektor makes this remark while asserting a strategy that, he hopes, will restore Troy to
its former prosperity—thereby restoring to Troy’s epithets the plenitude of their meaning.
This example arguably exhibits a greater degree of self-consciousness about the nature of a
formulaic style than any pregnant use of an epithet. Hektor’s statement not only stresses the
meaningfulness of epithets; it also draws attention to the possibility, inherent in such a style,
that  discrepancies  may arise between traditional  language and the context  of  its  use.  My
discussion will proceed, in the next section, by examining two further cases in the  Iliad  in
which such a discrepancy is highlighted. These cases show a number of curious similarities
that will prompt me to suggest that there is more at stake here than simply an awareness, on
the  part  of  the  medium of  Homeric  poetry,  of  a  problem that  has  exercised  critics  from
antiquity to the present day (although this awareness is itself worth noting). I will eventually
argue that we may observe in the ways in which Homeric poetry resolves this problem—the
problem of the occasional discrepancy between a formulaic epithet and its immediate context
—important differences between typically Iliadic and Odyssean attitudes toward the language
of poetry (and toward language in general), and between the ethical commitments of those
two traditions.
The Narrow Road
In  Iliad Book 7, as he chastises the Achaean champions for failing to answer Hektor’s
challenge, Nestor recounts the tale of an earlier contest between warriors, one that ought to
have ended quite differently, if might alone had been the decisive factor. Embedded in his
recollection  of  his  own youthful  encounter  with the  Arcadian  Ereuthalion  is  the  story of
‘glorious Areithoos, whom men and beautifully-belted women called by the epikl  sis ’—that
is, the ‘epithet’—‘korun   t   s  (“mace-man”)’:
             ’                                                                     
          ’                                                           ,
                         ,                                             
                                                                         
          ’      ’                                                                   ,  
                                                                        .
                                               ,                             ,
                                 ’      ’                                      
                               ·                                                  
                                        ,       ’                                        ·  
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               ’                    ,                                            .
(Il. 7.136-46)
And Ereuthalion, a godlike man, came forward as their champion,
bearing on his shoulders the arms of lord Areithoos,
glorious Areithoos, whom men and beautifully-belted women
used to call by the epikl  sis  ‘korun   t   s ’,
because he used to fight not with the bow or the long spear,
but with an iron mace he used to break the battle-lines;
Lykourgos slew him by stratagem—not at all by might—
on a narrow road, where his iron mace helped not 
to ward off destruction, for Lykourgos first with his spear
pierced him through the middle, and he was laid to the ground on his back;
and Lykourgos despoiled him of the arms that brazen Ares had given him.
Once again, as in the case of Hektor’s remark about Troy’s vanished wealth, an iterative verb
(                   [‘they  used  to  call’])  implies  that  Areithoos’  sobriquet  has  the  status  of  a
formulaic expression. In the words of Gregory Nagy, ‘the poetry is actually referring to an
epithet as an epithet’.13 Nestor’s characterization of the word as a conventional expression is
to a certain extent confirmed by the poem itself when, at the beginning of Book 7, the narrator
mentions                    . . .                  (‘mace-man Areithoos’, 7.9-10).14 
Nestor  makes  it  clear,  again  by  using  iterative  verbs  (                   ,                  ),  that
Areithoos’ often-repeated epithet was motivated by his own repeated behavior: he was called
‘mace-man’ because he habitually fought with a mace. Nestor’s tale, however, highlights the
13 . Nagy (1999 [1979]), 329 (§11n1). Note that the juxtaposition of this epikl  sis  with 
the epithets                and          nicely illustrates the distinction made by M. Parry (1971), 64, 
between ‘generic’ and ‘distinctive’ epithets.
14 . Note, however, that the phrase is not a true noun-epithet formula, in Parry’s sense, 
since it extends across the verse-boundary. In spite of the fact that the epithet would seem to 
indicate that the same Areithoos is meant as the one mentioned later in the book by Nestor, 
ancient critics disputed whether this was chronologically possible. Various solutions were 
proposed: see the bT scholia at Il. 7.9, the A scholia at Il. 7.10, Porph. ad Il. 7.9, Eust. Il. 
2.387.3-6 (van der Valk). There is reason to suspect that Nestor’s apparent reference to an 
established poetic convention evokes an independent Arcadian epic tradition, possibly 
centered on the figure of Lykourgos. Pausanias mentions a place called Phoizon on the road 
from Mantineia to Tegea, which, he tells us, locals consider to be the tomb (          ) of 
Areithoos (8.11.4; Pausanias clearly has in mind the story as related in the Iliad: cf. 8.4.10). 
Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen (RE, s.v. Areithoos) tentatively connected to this monument 
the Moleia, an Arcadian festival that, according to the scholia to the Argonautica of 
Apollonius of Rhodes (ad 1.164), was held in commemoration of Lykourgos’ slaying of 
Ereuthalion (either an error for ‘Areithoos’, as according to Hiller von Gaertringen and Carl 
Wendel, the editor of the scholia, or possibly a ‘genuine variant’, in the words of Nagy (1999 
[1979]), 332, §12n14). The wording of the scholion (                                                ’  
               [‘Lykourgos is honored among the Arcadians’]) suggests that Lykourgos was 
worshipped as a cult hero. In the view of Scodel (2002), 152, Areithoos ‘is surely objectively 
traditional’. The Moleia would have provided a suitable context for the preservation of lore, 
possibly including epic poetry, about his death at the hands of Lykourgos. 
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applicability of the epithet in general by exposing its momentary  inapplicability, that is, by
focusing  on  precisely  that  moment  in  Areithoos’  story  when  his  characteristic  epithet  is
contradicted by circumstances. But Areithoos does not for that reason cease to be the ‘mace-
man’: on the contrary, the very fact that this seemingly invincible warrior meets his end when
he is prevented from wielding his mace demonstrates that he is nothing but a ‘mace-man’.
The exception in this case truly proves the rule: by failing to be a                   ,  Areithoos
makes good his claim to the epithet. The contextual negation of the epithet’s significance
confirms its meaningfulness.
It is not simply by accident that Areithoos finds himself disarmed and unable to make use
of the prowess his epithet warrants. His adversary, Lykourgos, contrives the situation that
leads to his demise. Nestor characterizes Lykourgos’ plan as a matter of            (‘deception’),
a signal that we are dealing here with an instance of the familiar Homeric theme of rivalry
between a hero of         (‘might’) and a hero of             (‘cunning intelligence’), archetypally
represented by Akhilleus and Odysseus, respectively.15 Lykourgos is doubly identified as an
exponent of            ,  both by the reference to             and by his name, which, signifying ‘he
who wards  off  the  wolf’,  indicates  one  who possesses  an  affinity with  lupine  cunning.16
15 . See Nagy (1999 [1979]), 45-49 and passim; see pp. 328-32 for discussion of the tale 
of Areithoos as an example of this theme. It is in fact precisely the presence of the        /            
theme that permits us to understand the reason for the inclusion of the story of Areithoos and 
Lykourgos, a narrative that may at first appear only loosely connected to the main line of 
Nestor’s argument. The problem faced by the Achaeans when Hektor makes his challenge is 
that, in the absence of Akhilleus, they have no champion who can best Hektor purely on the 
basis of       .  By beginning his speech with Akhilleus’ father, Peleus, whom he imagines 
grieving over the lack of an answerer to Hektor’s challenge, Nestor signals, subtly, that his 
entire speech is framed in terms of this problem. The tale of Areithoos and Ereuthalion 
suggests that one way of overcoming invincible        is by employing           .  This is in fact 
precisely the strategy the Achaeans will adopt at the end of the book, when, on Nestor’s 
advice, they construct their defensive wall: Nestor’s plan is explicitly characterized as a          
(7.324; cf. Elmer [2013], 116, with n14). Hektor’s challenge, however, is met not by            
but by       ,  as represented by Ajax, and the contest ends indecisively. We may compare the 
role of Ajax in Book 15, as analyzed by Petegorsky (1982), 187-88: when a            to counter 
Hektor is sought, Ajax enters the battle (aided by the            of Hera’s seduction of Zeus), but 
his success is short-lived; he himself recognizes that ‘the best            is       ’, a recognition that 
points to Akhilleus as the only one capable of opposing Hektor. In glossing            as ‘cunning
intelligence’, I am drawing on Detienne and Vernant (1991).
16 . For the etymology, see Chantraine (2009), s.v.           . The same association between
the wolf and            is detectable in the name of Odysseus’ grandfather, Autolykos (‘lone 
wolf’), ‘who surpassed all men in trickery and oath-taking [i.e. perjury]’ (Od. 19.395-96), and
in the wolf-skin worn by Dolon in the Doloneia (Il. 10.334; I discuss this episode more fully 
below).
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Areithoos likewise bears a name—meaning ‘swift with Ares’ or ‘swift in battle’—that, in
addition to his characteristic method of fighting, underscores his connection to       . Nagy has
traced the widespread associations between swiftness and the brute force of        ;  one need
only think of ‘swift-footed Akhilleus’ to grasp how fundamental this association is to the
Iliad’s thematic matrix.17 Areithoos, the hero of       , is thus overmastered by the deliberate
contrivance of the hero of            .  Insofar as Lykourgos devises his plot in response to the
peculiar strength encapsulated in his opponent’s epithet, his success depends upon his ability
to  recognize  the  meaning  encoded  in  poetic  diction—and  to  exploit  the  limitations  such
diction implies. The            practiced by the hero of            is, in this tale, a matter of inverting
the value of a formulaic expression, of transforming what would normally be understood as a
marker of excellence into an index of liability.
More concretely,  of course,  Lykourgos’             consists  in  the deliberate  selection of  a
setting that neutralizes his opponent’s strengths—the ‘narrow road’ of line 143 (                    
      ).  Gaining  the  advantage  by  strategic  exploitation  of  environmental  circumstances  is
characteristic of a mode of fighting that is designated in Homeric poetry by the term          
(‘ambush’).18 Eustathius, in fact, describes the encounter precisely as a             (2.387.1 van
der Valk). Within the system of Homeric poetry,            stands in explicit contrast to              
(‘open battle’), and the relationship between these two kinds of warfare can be described in
terms of the contrast between            and       .19
17 . Nagy (1999 [1979]), 326-30, with reference to Areithoos. Edwards (1985), 15, notes 
that ‘Akhilleus’ distinctive epithets are dominated by the notion of swiftness. He is         ,  
          ,                  ,                      /           ,  and               .’ See also ibid. 19n9. In light of this 
association between speed of foot and       , it is striking that the Odysseus of the Odyssey—the
poem that spotlights his           —insists that the footrace is the one form of athletic contest at 
which he fears being bested (Od. 8.230-33; I thank the anonymous referee for reminding me 
of this passage). In the Iliad, Odysseus is able to claim victory in a footrace—but only with 
the help of Athene; this episode, moreover, concludes with a direct comparison between 
Odysseus and Akhilleus that implies the superiority of the latter in terms of speed (Il. 23.791-
92).
18 . Edwards (1985), 22. Edwards does not include Lykourgos’ attack in his catalogue of 
Iliadic           , although he cites it as an example of the kind of            of which            is a 
‘variety’ (19). I find no reason, however, not to count the story as a highly compressed 
instance of the            theme. For discussions of this theme in the Homeric poems, see 
Edwards (1985), 15-41, and Dué and Ebbott (2010), 31-87.
19 . Opposition between            and               : Edwards (1985), 18, and Dué and Ebbott 
(2010), 34-36; corresponds to the opposition between            and       : Edwards (1985), 39-40. 
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The ‘narrow road’ that forms the centerpiece of Lykourgos’ stratagem may seem like an
odd way of disabling Areithoos if indeed it is intended solely as a means of inhibiting the use
of his preferred weapon. It would have to have been a very narrow road indeed to impede the
swinging of a club.20 Lykourgos’ ploy becomes more intelligible, however, when we take into
consideration the other component of Areithoos’       , the speed signaled by his name. One of
the ‘Cretan lies’ told by Odysseus in the Odyssey suggests that the need to counteract such
speed may have been an established component  of the             theme: in  Odyssey 13,  the
disguised  Odysseus  tells  Athene  that  he  fled Crete  after  ambushing and killing  a  son of
Idomeneus named Orsilokhos:
                                      ,                                    
                                                                         . . . 
(Od. 13.260-61)
swift-footed Orsilokhos, who in wide Crete
surpassed hardy men in speed of foot . . .21 
While  this  fictional  attack  likewise  takes  place  along  a  road  (Od. 13.267-68),  it  is  not
specifically a narrow one; instead, it is the circumstance that the attack is made at night that
negates the victim’s natural advantage. In the case of Areithoos, it may be implied that the
narrowness  of  the  road  is  intended to  inhibit  all  of  Areithoos’  movements—not  just  the
motion of his mace-arm.22
The most striking indicator that there is a connection to be made between the ‘narrow road’
motif and the need to counter an opponent’s greater speed is provided by an episode that
20 . Pausanias reports that ‘the road becomes especially narrow’ (                                
                         , 8.11.4) as it passes by the reputed tomb of Areithoos. The phrasing likely 
indicates that he has the Iliad passage in mind, but the ‘narrow road’ may have featured 
prominently in other lore surrounding Areithoos.
21 . On this passage, see Edwards (1985), 33. It is striking that, as in the case of 
Areithoos, the victim of the ambush has both a significant name (        -            = ‘he who 
rouses the           ’) and a significant epithet (                   , an epithet Orsilokhos shares with 
none other than Akhilleus). The meaningfulness of this epithet as applied to Orsilokhos is 
underscored in the relative clause. (For similar cases in which an epithet is elaborated on by a 
subsequent relative clause, see Kakridis [1949], 124-25.)
22 . The story of another ‘mace-man’ is possibly relevant here. One of the brigands killed
by Theseus on his way to Athens was a certain Periphetes, who, like Areithoos, was given the 
epithet                    because of the iron club he used as a weapon. According to Ps.-
Apollodorus, Periphetes was lame (           . . .                          , Bibl. 3.217). If this story is 
considered as a possible multiform of the tale of Lykourgos and Areithoos, it suggests that the
motif of speed (or the negation of it) has an established place in the tradition.
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includes the only other instance of the phrase                              in the Iliad: the chariot race
of Book 23. The episode centers on the stratagem by which Antilokhos overcomes Menelaos’
superior horses, even though Antilokhos’ horses are recognized as the slowest of the five
competing teams (Il. 309-10). As the contestants near the finish line, Antilokhos sees that the
first prize is out of reach, but he perceives an opportunity to finish ahead of Menelaos in
second place. He explains his plan to his horses, and immediately acts on it:
      ’                                                                            ·
             ’                                                             
                                                   ,                          .
             ’ ,                                                                 
                                                             ·             ’             
                                                                                     .
(Il. 23.414-19)
‘… But follow closely upon him and hasten as much as possible;
I myself will think of a device
to overtake him on a narrow road, nor will the opportunity escape me.’
So he spoke, and they, in awe of their master’s command,
hurried on the more for a short time. And quickly, then,
steadfast Antilokhos spotted a narrowing of the hollowed road.
Antilokhos attempts to overtake Menelaos as the road narrows; Menelaos, fearing a collision,
reigns in his horses; and Antilokhos drives across the finish line in second place.
The episode is not a            ,  but the name of its protagonist (Anti-lokhos, ‘he who is a
match for the           ’ ) indicates its affinity with the            theme; so too does the recurrent
emphasis on            as the means by which an opponent’s superior strength may be overcome.
The entire scene unfolds, in fact, as yet another example of the dramatization of the           -     
rivalry. Nestor, noting that Antilokhos is driving the weakest horses, counsels the use of           ,
and delivers a short ‘sermon on the uses of            ’.23 Antilokhos, as we have seen, speaks
explicitly of his reliance on           , on a ‘contrivance’ or ‘stratagem’. Menelaos emphasizes
his own superiority in         (23.578),  while implying that Antilokhos has unduly exploited
           (‘trickery’,  23.585).  The  narrator,  meanwhile,  describes  Antilokhos’  maneuver  in
phraseology that echoes the earlier description of Lykourgos’ tactics.24 There is, moreover,
23 . Richardson (1993), 209. The superiority of            over        is made explicit at 23.315,
                                       ’                                 (‘a woodcutter achieves far greater success by 
           than by       ’).
24 . Compare 23.515,                 ,                           ,                                            
(‘overtaking Menelaos by cunning, not at all by speed’), with 7.142,                                      
        ,                              (‘Lykourgos slew him by stratagem, not at all by might’).
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another, crucial respect in which the episode recalls the tale of Areithoos: like the story of the
‘mace-man,’  the  chariot  race  narrative  draws attention  to  an  apparent  conflict between a
formulaic epithet and its context, precisely in order to underscore the meaningfulness of the
epithet.
As Menelaos slows his horses to avoid a crash, he calls out to Antilokhos:
              ’                                                                 ·
      ’ ,                  ’                                                              .
(Il. 23.439-40)
‘Antilokhos, there is no man more calamitous than you.
Go to your ruin, since we Achaeans were wrong to call you                     ’.
I will perhaps be accused of tendentiousness for rendering the infinitive                    with the
participle of the same verb,                     , an epithet applied to a number of characters in the
Homeric  corpus—most  notably  Telemakhos  in  the  Odyssey—and  often  translated  as
‘prudent’. Antilokhos is not a regular recipient of this epithet—although, as we shall see, he
does receive it  in  this  episode,  and the Neleids  in  general  seem to enjoy a reputation as
                    .
25
 In defense of my rendering, I note that, as in previous examples, an imperfect
verb (          ) makes it clear that Menelaos is speaking of a recurrent locution in the past: he
appears to be invoking a formulaic expression. The suspicion that we are meant to think of the
generic epithet                      is confirmed a short while later, when Menelaos himself employs
the participle in a remarkable way. As prizes are awarded, he lodges a complaint against
Antilokhos, beginning his speech thus:
                                                                          .  
(Il. 23.570)
‘Antilokhos, formerly                     , what have you done?’
25 . In the Odyssey, both Nestor (3.20) and his son Peisistratos (3.52; cf. 4.204-6) are 
described as being                     .  Discussing the application of the epithet to Antilokhos in 
Iliad 23, Heath (2001), 136, writes that the ‘treatment of the adjective clearly reveals that the 
poet is very much aware of the association of                      with the son of Nestor’. 
Antilokhos’ other epithets in the Iliad are as follows: in the nominative:                
(‘descendant of Neleus’, 23.514), (                   )                            (‘son of [great-hearted] 
Nestor’, 5.565, 13.400, 23.541, 23.755; cf. 10.229, 18.16, 23.596),                      (‘steadfast’, 
13.396, 15.582, 23.419); in the genitive:                      (‘son of Nestor’, 23.353),                  
(‘blameless’, 23.522); in the dative:                  (‘fierce’, 13.418); in the accusative: 
                                             (‘son of great-hearted Nestor’, 17.653).
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The  phrase                                    (‘formerly                      ’)  is,  in  essence,  a  negated  or
‘bracketed’ epithet. Menelaos claims that,  although Antilokhos has previously been called
                    , his actions during the race have belied his claim to the epithet. Even more than
simply drawing attention to a contradiction between the expression and the context of its use,
Menelaos asserts that the context has rendered the word generally invalid as an epithet for
Antilokhos.
But has it? Menelaos seems to understand the term                      as an indicator of prudence
in a general sense, and on that score he may have a point: Antilokhos can certainly be accused
of recklessness. Or else Menelaos may mean to highlight Antilokhos’ aggressiveness toward
an older  and socially  superior  man.  As J.  B.  Hainsworth notes,                       is  regularly
‘applied to youthful or subordinate characters who know their place’.26 The word’s primary
associations, however, are with prudence as a speaker, as we may see from the fact that the
epithet  occurs  most  frequently  in  formulaic  speech  introductions,  and  from  its  frequent
application to heralds and wise counselors.27 From this point of view, Menelaos’ complaint
seems misplaced. Antilokhos’ exploitation of the ‘narrow road’ is not an adequate measure of
his right to be called                     . It is only in the sequel to the race, the verbal dispute that
develops  between  the  two  claimants  of  the  second-place  prize,  that  Antilokhos  has  the
opportunity to prove the appropriateness of the epithet. By employing a deft verbal strategy—
simultaneously expressing deference toward Menelaos and asserting his right to the disputed
mare—Antilokhos manages to appease Menelaos and retain the prize. The narrator, as though
answering Menelaos’ criticism, introduces this speech with a formula that now seems laden
with significance:
         ’        ’                                                               ·
(Il. 23.586)
Then                      Antilokhos addressed him in turn . . .
26 . Hainsworth (1993), ad Il. 9.57-8.
27 . See Heath (2001), 133-35.
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This is the only occurrence of this formula with Antilokhos as subject. No less an authority on
the proper usage of Homeric diction than the narrator himself thus confirms Antilokhos’ title
to the epithet                     .28
Overall, the chariot race and its epilogue tend in precisely the same direction as the tale of
Areithoos.  Both  episodes  draw  attention  to  a  real  or  apparent  contradiction  between  a
formulaic epithet and the context of its application. In both cases, the contradiction arises
because of the manipulation, by a representative of           , of the special circumstances created
by the constricted environment of a                            , a ‘narrow road’. And in both cases the
meaningfulness and appropriateness of the epithet is ultimately reasserted.  These passages
display  an  awareness  of  the  possibility  that  a  formulaic  style  may  give  rise  to  certain
interpretive tensions, as well as an anxiousness to resolve these tensions by establishing once
and for all the meaningfulness of formulas. The language of the epic medium passes through
the crucible of the ‘narrow road’ and emerges fully validated.29
An Iliadic ethic of language use
The Iliadic determination to assert  the meaningfulness  of epic language in  spite  of  the
uncertainties introduced by contextual constraints or the maneuvers of            is not an idle or
secondary motif. It is intimately bound up with one of the Iliad’s central ethical commitments
—if we may identify the poem’s ethical commitments with those of its hero, Akhilleus. In the
Embassy of Book 9, which is arguably the pivot on which the whole poem turns, Akhilleus
28 . There is a striking similarity between this confirmation of formulaic language and the
narrator’s gloss on another crucial formula some 50 lines earlier: see Elmer (2013), 194, on Il.
23.539-40.
29 . Given the heightened awareness of poetic style on display in these passages, it is 
tempting, especially in the context of the chariot race, to see the ‘narrow road’ as an extension
of the traditional metaphor of the ‘chariot of song’ (for a survey of examples, see Nünlist 
[1998], 255-64), or simply that of the                        , the ‘path of song’ (cf. h. Merc. 451; Pi. 
O. 9.47, P. 2.96; Call. Jov. 78; see also Nagy (2009), 230-32, on the etymology of           , of 
which he reconstructs an original meaning ‘thread, threading’). On such a reading, the 
                            would figure the constraints that confront the poet in a formulaic medium. 
Lykourgos and Antilokhos, the champions of           , could accordingly be seen as figures for 
the poet who is able to navigate these constraints successfully. Callimachus (Aet. fr. 1.25-28), 
possibly alluding to Il. 23, uses the image of a ‘more narrow road’ to represent his poetic 
ideal. 
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famously declares his determination to tolerate nothing less than the total transparency of
language:
                                                                         
       ’                                                    ,                        .
(Il. 9.312-13)
As hateful to me as the gates of Hades is the man
who conceals one thing in his heart and declares another.30
The ‘narrow road’ motif, with its anxiety over the meaningfulness of formulaic epithets, can
be understood as an echo of this commitment to transparency. Of course, there is a difference
between  a  contextually  inappropriate  epithet  and  the  kind  of  concealment  or  outright
dishonesty that Akhilleus abhors. The possibility that the language of epic might at times be
used  indifferently—that  words  might  mean  less  than  they  appear  to  say—nevertheless
threatens to undermine the total transparency to which Akhilleus aspires.31
It is essential to recognize the extent to which a determination to uphold the meaningfulness
and transparency of  language structures  the  entire  plot-arc  of  the  Iliad.  Ruth  Scodel  has
argued convincingly that the tragic turn in Akhilleus’ story—his decision to allow Patroklos
to enter the battle in his place—is the direct consequence of his resolve to abide by a promise
that he (mistakenly) believes has been conveyed to Agamemnon and the Achaean leaders at
the conclusion of the Embassy.32 This is the promise that he will not return to the battlefield
until the fighting reaches his own ships, a promise that he made in response to Ajax, the third
of three ambassadors to plead with him, and that he explicitly directed the ambassadors to
report back to Agamemnon (Il. 9.644-55). Akhilleus is unaware that, in actuality, Odysseus
reported only his first response, which he gave in reply to Odysseus’ entreaty, and in which he
declared that he would sail for Phthia in the morning. From the Achaeans’ point of view, of
course, he has already falsified this declaration by remaining at Troy, but he does not realize
30 . For the pivotal position of the Embassy in the poem’s economy, cf. Wilson (2002), 1:
‘Iliad Book 9 is widely regarded in contemporary Homeric scholarship as the interpretive key 
to the poem, the linchpin to its plot and tragic vision’. 
31 . Heiden (2009), 432-33, identifies ironies that ‘compromise’ Akhilleus’ claim to 
transparency, and that seem to him to be emblematic of certain tensions in Homeric criticism. 
These ironies—Akhilleus’ failure to achieve an ideal transparency—are, to my way of 
thinking, equally emblematic of tensions inherent in the formulaic style.
32 . Scodel (1989), offering this description of Akhilleus’ character (94): ‘Achilles is 
committed to a straightforward relation between thought and word, word and action’. 
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this; instead, although he is prepared to relinquish his anger, he believes he cannot reenter the
battle himself without contravening the message that he thinks has been transmitted to the
Achaeans (16.60-63). The essential connection between the Embassy and these later events is
underscored by the fact that the fateful exchange in which Akhilleus explains his position to
Patroklos and authorizes the latter to fight in his place is introduced by an echo of his earlier
affirmation of the ethic of transparency. Akhilleus invites Patroklos to make the appeal that
will ultimately lead to Patroklos’ own death with the words             ,                        ,       
                        (‘Speak plainly, do not conceal it in your mind, that we may both know’,
16.19).33
The events of the final third of the poem are therefore determined by Akhilleus’ absolute
commitment to the transparency and meaningfulness of speech, much as are the events of the
first third; for the plot developments leading up to the Embassy are similarly the result of
Akhilleus’ decision to bind himself by his word. Athene, enjoining him in Book 1 to forego
violence in his quarrel with Agamemnon, advises him instead to ‘reproach [Agamemnon] in
words as to how it will be’ (                                                                ,  Il. 1.211). The rather
remarkable construction of the verb                       with a relative clause in the future tense—
unique  in  the  poem  to  my  knowledge—indicates  that  Akhilleus’  ‘reproach’  will  be
meaningful to the extent that it dictates subsequent events.34 Akhilleus acts on this advice with
a speech that is not only a masterpiece of blame—               in the usual sense—but that also
includes his great oath, which is not so much a declaration of his own intended course of
action  as  a  prediction  of  the  situation  that  will  confront  the  Achaeans  as  a  result.35 The
awesome rhetoric with which he frames this oath—the description of the scepter, ‘which will
33 . Cramer (1976), 301-2, notes that Thetis addresses the same line to Akhilleus when 
she asks him to explain the cause of his grief in Book 1 (Il. 1.363), and that she uses an 
abbreviated version (             ,                 , 18.74) when she asks him why he is weeping in 
Book 18 (18.73), after the death of Patroklos. The imperative to speak plainly thus punctuates 
the narrative at each of the plot’s major points of inflection.
34 . When                      is construed with a relative clause, the clause ordinarily 
summarizes the past or present actions that are being cited in reproach, as at Il. 2.255-56. 
35 . For blame-speech as a distinct genre that includes               , see Martin (1989), 18 
and 68-77. Akhilleus’ prediction of the future brings to mind Adam Parry’s remark (à propos 
of Akhilleus’ declaration, in his great speech in Book 9, that he will say ‘how things will be 
accomplished’ [                                        , Il. 9.310]): ‘Such certainty is godlike’ (A. Parry 
[1956], 5n1).
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never again sprout leaves or shoots’ (Il. 1.234-35), and so on—is yet another expression of the
strength of his  ethical commitment to the use of language that  is  consequential  and fully
freighted with meaning.
In Book 9, Akhilleus delivers his affirmation of the ethic of transparency in a context that
seems designed to set up a contrast between this ethic and the very different one represented
by his addressee, Odysseus. Indeed, Akhilleus’ words—‘hateful to me . . . is the man who
conceals one thing in his  heart  and declares another’—seem to be directed specifically at
Odysseus,  who has  omitted  from his  report  of  Agamemnon’s  conciliatory  offer  its  most
invidious clause, the demand that Akhilleus should acknowledge his subordinate position (Il.
9.158-61). Strictly speaking, Akhilleus cannot know this, but it is difficult not to associate his
reference to concealment with Odysseus’ striking reticence.36 His words ring even truer as a
condemnation  of  Odysseus  at  the  end of  the  episode,  when Odysseus  can once again be
observed to be guilty of a significant omission. Yet Odysseus has good reasons for concealing
things: his strategic acts of omission serve discernible diplomatic and political ends.37 His
ethical  commitments  privilege  the  achievement  of  utilitarian  goals  at  the  expense  of
transparency  in  communication.  Even  more:  Odysseus  displays  a  positive  readiness  to
cultivate a lack of transparency in order to benefit the interests he serves.
Book 9 thus unfolds as a kind of contest between two opposed figures representing two
opposed ethical positions with regard to language use. Akhilleus, the archetypal hero of       ,
strives to uphold the transparency and consequentiality of language as a meaningful medium
36 . Cf. Whitman (1958), 192, Scodel (1989), 93, Donlan (1993), 166, Cairns (2011), 
105-7. See also Elmer (2013), 95, on the way Akhilleus’ remark about the ‘gates of Hades’ 
echoes the very words omitted by Odysseus. Some commentators interpret Akhilleus’ remark 
as being directed toward Agamemnon, whose intention to consign him to a subordinate 
position he senses, notwithstanding Odysseus’s omission (cf. Heiden [2009], 433). This is an 
effective means of accounting for the passage in a psychologically realistic way, but the 
listener or reader is much more likely to think of Odysseus in connection with this remark, 
especially if he or she is familiar with the Odyssey. In that poem, Odysseus uses the same 
figure of speech to condemn liars, even as he lies about his own identity:                            
                                              /               ,                                                         (‘As hateful to me 
as the gates of Hades is the man who, yielding to poverty, utters falsehoods’, Od. 14.156-57; 
cf. Wilson [2002], 86). Odysseus is even instructed by Agamemnon in the Underworld to ‘say
one thing and keep another hidden’ (Od. 11.443).
37 . These are not far to seek in the case of the omission of Agamemnon’s demand for 
submission: Akhilleus obviously could not accept any offer of restitution that included such a 
demand. On Odysseus’ motivation for failing to report Akhilleus’ response to Ajax, see 
Scodel (1989), 96-8.
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of communication.38 Odysseus, the hero of           , exploits gaps and silences in an attempt to
accomplish  an  objective—the  reintegration  of  Akhilleus—that,  if  achieved  on  the  terms
proposed by Agamemnon, must be felt by Akhilleus himself as a defeat.39 There is a certain
similarity here to the ‘narrow road’ motif,  and more particularly to the tale of Areithoos,
whose story recalls (or rather prefigures) that of Akhilleus with respect to more than just the
speed signaled by his name. In both cases, the hero of       , encountering an opponent whose
           works in part by disrupting the normal operation of language, is undone by remaining
true to words that are somehow central to his heroic identity. Areithoos falls victim to the
           because he is constrained by his epithet as much as by the narrowness of the road.
Akhilleus, although he manages to avoid Agamemnon’s ‘gift-attack’, nevertheless ultimately
meets disaster—losing not only his closest companion, but also, ultimately, his own life—
because he cannot deviate from his own stated positions.40 That is not to say that the tale of
Areithoos (or, for that matter, the ‘narrow road’ motif more generally) is a direct commentary
on the story of Akhilleus. It is, rather, a recapitulation of certain themes that lie at the heart of
that story, above all a commitment to the proposition that words can and should be made to
bear the full weight of their meanings.
The fact that  Akhilleus,  like Areithoos,  ends up on the losing side of a contest  with a
representative of a very different view of words and their meaning should not be taken as in
any way undermining the value of this commitment. On the contrary, the poem as a whole
must  be  understood  as  on  some level  an  endorsement  of  Akhilleus’  position,  since  it  is
precisely because of his loyalty to this position that he achieves the            enshrined in the
epic. To celebrate Akhilleus is to celebrate his unswerving allegiance to transparency. For this
reason we are entitled to make a rough equivalence between Akhilleus’ ethical commitments
—including what might be called the ‘Akhillean’ ethic of language use—and those of the
Iliad. And yet the poem permits us glimpses of an alternative—an ‘Odyssean’ ethic—that
cannot be simply rejected as invalid. After all, Akhilleus’ own protégé, Antilokhos, succeeds
38 . For further discussion of this point, see Elmer (2013), 79-81.
39 . Cf. Donlan (1993), 165-66.
40 . On Agamemnon’s offer as a ‘gift-attack’, see Donlan (1993), 164; cf. Cairns (2011), 
106-7.
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by adopting an Odyssean strategy of            in the chariot race. And while Odysseus may seem
to fare poorly in Book 9 by comparison with the moral and rhetorical force of Akhilleus’ great
speech, the practical value of his mode of action is fully vindicated in those scenes in which
he is able to operate on his own terms.
The ‘Odyssean’ ethic in the Iliad
In fact, Book 9, with its prominent display of Akhilleus’ commitment to transparency, is
followed immediately by an episode that seems designed to showcase the ‘Odyssean’ ethic in
action.  The  Doloneia  of  Book  10,  describing  a  night  raid  conducted  by  Diomedes  and
Odysseus,  gives  the  latter  the  opportunity  to  employ  the  full  range  of  his            .  The
controversy over the authenticity of this book is well known. Debate as to whether or not it
‘belongs’  in  our  Iliad extends  back  to  antiquity.41 Many,  perhaps  most,  contemporary
Homerists reject it as un-Homeric. An often-noted redundancy—Books 9 and 10 appear to
describe different ways of meeting the emergency presented by a single night—has led some
to characterize the two books as alternatives.42 Without entering into this controversy in detail,
I align myself with the minority of scholars who argue that Book 10 is an organic part of the
Iliad’s  design.43 In  doing so,  I  propose  to  find in  the  apparent  redundancy that  has  been
observed in the juxtaposition of Books 9 and 10 precisely the same contrastive strategy that
one observes in the juxtaposition of Akhilleus and Odysseus in Book 9. Book 10, in other
words, expands on the contrast between the Akhillean and Odyssean ethics that is already
adumbrated  within  Book  9.  As  a  counterpoint  to  the  latter’s  forceful  presentation  of
Akhilleus’ point of view, the Doloneia shows us an Odysseus who is more than willing to
41 . See the discussion of Dué and Ebbott (2010), 5-6, on the famous scholion at the 
beginning of Book 10 in the Codex Townleianus:                                                               
                                                                        ,                                                                                 
(‘they say that this rhapsody was composed separately by Homer and was not part of the Iliad,
but was introduced into the poem’s arrangement by Peisistratos’).
42 . See Petegorsky (1982), 203, with reference to Klingner (1940), 339, and Lord (2000 
[1960]), 194.
43 . For argumentation, see Petegorsky (1982), 175-259, and Dué and Ebbott (2010). 
Shewan (1911) attempted to refute the arguments leveled against the book by Analytic 
scholars.
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take advantage of an ambiguous way of speaking—and ready to acknowledge the ethical
complexity of his methods.
Broadly speaking, Book 10 is a greatly expanded instance of the            theme.44 It recounts
two  parallel  missions  to  reconnoiter  the  enemy’s  camp,  undertaken  by  Odysseus  and
Diomedes on one side, and on the other by the Trojan Dolon, who gives the episode the name
assigned to it by ancient critics. After some introductory material, relating the recruiting of the
spies, the narrative describes the capture, interrogation, and killing of Dolon by Odysseus and
Diomedes, and then the killing of the just-arrived Trojan ally Rhesos, along with a number of
his men, and the stealing of his horses.
The opposition  between             and         resurfaces  here  in  multiple  ways.  Although the
character  of  Rhesos  is  relatively  undeveloped  in  the  Iliad,  the  broader  tradition  clearly
identifies him as a figure of        and a formidable force on the battlefield.45 His white horses
are described by Dolon as ‘swift as the wind’ (                                                 ,  Il. 10.437), an
indication that they partake of the same kind of impetuous might as Menelaos’ team. The
killing of Rhesos and the capture of his horses by stealth are therefore perfectly intelligible in
terms of the            /        opposition. The encounter with Dolon is more complex. The name of
this figure signals an affinity with             (‘deception’), and by extension with            .  The
wolf-skin  he  dons  for  his  reconnaissance  mission  likewise  assimilates  him to  the  lupine
Lykourgos. All of this is appropriate for a character who appears in the Iliad solely in the role
of  a  nocturnal  spy.  Dolon  does  have,  however,  one  quality  that  aligns  him  with  those
representatives of        against whom the stratagems of the            are typically directed: he is
extraordinarily fast, to the extent that he earns what is otherwise, to use Parry’s terminology, a
‘distinctive’ epithet of Akhilleus,                (‘swift-footed’, 10.316).46
44 . See Dué and Ebbott (2010), 69-79.
45 . The scholia report two alternative traditions: according to one, Rhesos fought for one
day at Troy, and inflicted heavy losses on the Achaeans; according to the other, he would 
have become invincible (                        ) if he and his horses had been able to drink the 
water of the Skamandros. For the text of the relevant scholia and discussion, see Dué and 
Ebbott (2010), 90-106. 
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As though anticipating that their foe might be possessed of some such physical advantage,
Odysseus devises a plan aimed precisely at neutralizing swiftness when he senses Dolon’s
approach. He instructs Diomedes:
      ’                                                                   
            ·                      ’                                                 
                    ·         ’                                                  ,
                                                                             
                           ,                                            .
                                                                       
                  ·       ’      ’                                                  .
(Il. 10.344-50)
‘Let us allow him first to proceed along the plain
a little; then if we rush at him we might seize him
swiftly. But if he should outpace us in speed of foot,
drive him always away from the camp toward the ships,
lunging at him with your spear, lest somehow he escape to the city.’
Speaking thus, they turned aside from the road, 
among the corpses. And Dolon ran swiftly past them in his heedlessness.
The trap for  Dolon is  laid along a  road.  While  this           is  not  specifically                    ,
nevertheless the            by which Odysseus overcomes his opponent’s superior speed centers
on the constricting of the space available for maneuvering. Odysseus instructs Diomedes, in
effect,  to  narrow the road.  In  the execution of  this  plan,  they ‘turn  aside’  in  a  way that
resembles Antilokhos’ swerving from the course in the chariot race.47 All this is to say that we
are dealing here with a passage that is, if not strictly an instance of the ‘narrow road’ motif,
certainly closely related.
46 . Cf. Dué and Ebbott (2010), 320; apart from this occurrence and the twenty-two 
occasions on which it is used of Akhilleus, the word is applied three times to horses (Il. 2.764,
17.614, 23.376) and once to the generic plural ‘horsemen’ (23.262). In the Odyssey, the word 
is used only twice, both times of Akhilleus (11.471, 538). As Dué and Ebbott note, the epithet
cannot but evoke Akhilleus. As in the case of Areithoos, the episode provides a kind of 
indirect commentary on the absence of Akhilleus (see above, n. 15). In pitting Odysseus 
against an adversary who recalls, in one respect at least, Akhilleus, the narrative ties into the 
broader theme of rivalry between Odysseus and Akhilleus (on which see Nagy [1999], 42-
58). As argued by Petegorsky (1982), 175-254, Book 10 can be interpreted as a response to 
the challenge issued by Akhilleus in Book 9 at the end of his speech to Odysseus, in which he 
declares that the Achaeans should ‘devise another, better           ’ (Il. 9.423), since their plan to 
coopt him has failed. Book 10 demonstrates what can be achieved by Odyssean            in the 
absence of Akhilleus. 
47 .                                                /                    (‘they turned aside from the road, among 
the corpses’, Il. 10.346-50), compare                                                                                 / 
                   ,                                                       (‘turning his horses, Antilokhos drove them 
off the road; turning aside a little, he pursued [Menelaos]’, 23.423-24). These two passages 
represent the only collocations of          and                in the Iliad.
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Once the trap is sprung and Dolon is in the hands of his captors, Odysseus directs his          
to a new end: the extraction of information from the Trojan spy. His cunning now focuses
more squarely on linguistic  snares,  and he is  quick to exploit  a  crucial  ambiguity.  When
Dolon pleads for his life, offering a substantial ransom if he is spared, Odysseus offers words
of seeming reassurance: ‘Take courage, and let not death weigh on your heart’ (             ,         
                                                        ,  Il. 10.383). With this encouragement, Odysseus easily
pumps Dolon for information on Hektor’s plans and the layout of the Trojan encampment,
after which Diomedes kills the prisoner. Some commentators have accused Odysseus of lying
outright, and find in this breach of a presumed heroic ethos evidence in favor of the view that
the  Doloneia  is  ‘un-Homeric’.48 Against  this  verdict  one  may insist  not  only that  such a
blanket  notion  of  heroic  ethics  is  suspect,  but  also,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  that
Odysseus does not in fact lie. His carefully-worded reply to Dolon suggests that the latter’s
life is secure without actually saying so. This is, it would seem, a textbook case of ‘concealing
one thing in one’s heart and declaring another’—not a lie, but the cultivation of an ambiguity
that disrupts the ideal transparency of speech. It is the putting into practice of the ‘Odyssean’
ethic of language use, with results that are obviously beneficial to the Achaeans.
Arguably the most revealing moment in Book 10, so far as this ethic is concerned, involves
not Odysseus’ own use of language, but rather the restrictions he imposes on the kinds of
language that may appropriately be used of him. Early in the episode, Diomedes, who has
agreed  to  undertake  the  night  mission,  asks  for  another  to  accompany  him;  he  selects
Odysseus from among several volunteers on the grounds that he has just those qualities that
are likely to ensure a successful              (‘return’). As he puts it:
                      ’                                                     ,
                                                                              
                                    ,                                            .  
               ’                                                                 
                               ,                                        .
(Il. 10.243-47)
‘How, then, could I fail to think of godlike Odysseus,
who is above others possessed of a daring heart and a courageous spirit
in toils of all sorts, and Pallas Athene holds him dear.
If he is my companion, even from blazing fire
48 . See, for example, Buchan (2004), 119-20 (quoted at Dué and Ebbott [2010], 34n5).
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would we both return, since he especially knows how to use his intelligence.’
Odysseus responds to  this  encomium by protesting against  the very act  of evaluating his
virtues and flaws:
                     ’                  ’                                       ·
                                            ’                                     .  
      ’             . . . 
(Il. 10. 249-51)
Son of Tydeos, do not either praise me excessively or criticize me,
for you speak these things among the Argives, who know them well.
But let us go . . . 
How should we interpret Odysseus’ curiously self-effacing remark, which is not necessarily
the position we would expect to be taken by a Homeric hero? Since Diomedes,  with his
mention of              and          (‘intelligence’), has evoked precisely the kind of heroism that
defines Odysseus’ role in the  Odyssey, it is possible that Odysseus’ unwillingness to be so
described is an expression of an Iliadic impulse to keep the Odyssey at arms length—Monro’s
Law in  reverse.49 If  so,  this  distancing  gesture  can  only  hedge  the  more  or  less  overtly
Odyssean thematics of the episode as a whole.50 A second possibility is to interpret Odysseus’
remark in light of these thematics, by noting that his reluctance to be explicitly characterized
corresponds to the  Odyssey’s  general  strategy of  indirection in naming and describing its
central hero.
There are likely other ways of interpreting these lines, but in any case what is most striking
is  that  Odysseus’  prohibition  is  directed  specifically  against  ethical descriptions  of  his
character. He resists the application of either praise or blame to his actions, suggesting instead
that the Achaeans can and should come to their own conclusions. By extension, the audience
member or reader of these lines is likewise challenged to formulate his or her own judgment
of Odysseus’ character—and to recognize the ethical complexity of doing so. For, however
else we might be inclined to interpret Odysseus’ remark, we must also admit that it implicitly
49 . On the relation between              and         , see the essential work of Frame (1978). 
Diomedes’ mention of blazing fire may itself be an evocation of the Odyssey: the same 
phrase,                                , occurs twice in that poem in close thematic connection with 
Odysseus’ return (Od. 19.39, 20.25), and in his interview with Penelope Odysseus adopts the 
pseudonym Aithon (‘burning/fiery one’, 19.183). Addressing Patroklos in Book 16, Akhilleus
uses the phrase                                 to designate the fire that threatens to deprive the Achaeans
of their              (Il. 16.81).
50 . On the Odyssean character of Book 10, see Petegorsky (1982), 193-200.
22
acknowledges, even underscores, the difficulty of either straightforwardly praising or blaming
him. Such a cautionary note is appropriately sounded at the beginning of an episode in which
Odysseus’ actions—including his exploitation of linguistic ambiguity—are, to say the least,
ethically  questionable.  The  ‘Odyssean’  ethic,  as  dramatized  in  Book  10,  would  seem to
include  not  only  a  willingness  to  exploit  linguistic  ambiguity  but  also  a  corresponding
unwillingness to submit to direct assessment. In other words, the ethic, acknowledging its
own ethical ambivalence, demands the cultivation of ambiguity both in its practice and in its
evaluation. To adapt a remark made by Pindar in a context that is not without connection to
the present discussion,                      , ‘inflexible words’, can only do violence to a character
as complex as that of Odysseus.51
The ‘Odyssean’ ethic and the Odyssey
                      are, of course, precisely what Akhilleus demands. I have argued that the
Iliad  largely  endorses  his  position.  To the  extent  that  the  poem privileges  the  Akhillean
commitment to words of full and fixed meaning—and it might be said that the testing and
validation of formulaic epithets we have observed in connection with the ‘narrow road’ motif
is a manifestation of an Iliadic drive to ensure that the poem’s           are in fact              —
Odysseus will  always pose something of a challenge to Iliadic poetics. What, then, about
Odysseus’ own poem? Can we detect in the Odyssey an attitude toward the use of language,
and  especially  formulaic  language, that  somehow  reflects  the  constantly-foregrounded
                     of its protagonist?52 
51 . I refer here to the following statement from the final epode of Nemean 7:        ’           
                                  |                                                          |            (‘my heart will never say 
that I have dragged Neoptolemos about with inflexible words’, 102-4). As David Bouvier 
pointed out in the discussion following a talk he delivered on the Odyssey’s oblique 
references to questionable aspects of Odysseus’ career (‘How Much Does the Odyssey Know 
about Odysseus’ Dark Side?: Odysseus’ “Hybris” in Demodokos’ Song’, Harvard University, 
April 15, 2014), these lines imply that the celebration in song of a Neoptolemos or an 
Odysseus (discussed by Pindar in lines 20-30, immediately prior to the first mention of 
Neoptolemos) require                     —verbal ‘versatility’—precisely because the deeds 
attributed to these figures can be ethically problematic. Bouvier’s paper stressed the 
widespread association between Odysseus and Neoptolemos in literature and art, especially 
with regard to atrocities committed during the sack of Troy.
52 . A distinction between Iliadic and Odyssean poetics not unrelated to the one outlined 
here is suggested by de Jong (1994), who points out that the Odyssey’s thematization of 
hidden, secret thoughts stands in direct contrast to Akhilleus’ ideal of transparency (see esp. 
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I will limit myself here to the discussion of a single example that points in this direction; a
complete examination of the question is beyond the scope of this paper. I have chosen my
example—the application of the epithet              (‘blameless’) to Aigisthos at  Odyssey 1.29
(                                   ), which has been called ‘perhaps the most notoriously inappropriate
Homeric adjective’—for two reasons.53 In the first place, this phrase has been one of the most
visible touchstones in the debate over the meaningfulness of Homeric epithets. Anne Amory
Parry adopted it as the title and centerpiece of her book-length rejoinder to Milman Parry.54
‘Blameless Aigisthos’ thus brings me back to the problem with which I began this essay. At
the same time, as I will argue, the phrase functions as an index of the ethical ambivalence of
Odysseus even within his own epic. It therefore offers a convenient means of tracing within
the Odyssey the same ethical ambiguity I have argued for in Iliad 10.
It may seem that I am now wandering off the ‘narrow road’ of my title; and indeed the
‘narrow road’ motif, as we have seen it in the Iliad, does not occur in the Odyssey. In his own
epic, however, Odysseus in many ways comes into his own as the hero of the ‘narrow road’.
He devises a way out of the narrow quarters of Polyphemos’ cave, and he charts a course
through the                    (‘strait’) that divides Skylla from Kharybdis (Od. 12.234). He is the
only one, among all his men, who passes successfully through all of the perils of the return
journey. On Ithaca, the success of the            he lays for the Suitors hinges on his ability to
prevent his adversaries from gaining access to the exits. This restriction of spatial freedom,
reminiscent  of  Odysseus’  plan  for  capturing  Dolon  and  of  Lykourgos’  tactics  against
Areithoos, is prefigured by the disguised Odysseus himself in these ominous words addressed
to the Suitor Eurymakhos:
       ’                                             ’                                ,
                                        ,                                 ’            ,  
                                                                            .  
(Od. 18.384-86)
If Odysseus should return and arrive in his native land,
you would soon find these doors, wide though they be,
narrow as you fled out through the doorway.
pp. 30 and 48).
53 . Quotation from Combellack (1982), 361.
54 . A. A. Parry (1973).
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Odysseus shows himself to be a master of Lykourgan strategy.55 
This brings me to ‘blameless’ (             ) Aigisthos. Milman Parry cited the application of
this epithet to the seducer of Klytaimnestre and murderer of Agamemnon as a prime example
of ‘the illogical uses of the epithet’, and thus as evidence for his claim that generic epithets
were used with ‘indifference’ on the part  of singers and audience members alike.56 Anne
Amory Parry countered that the illogicality sensed by her father-in-law, and by a line of
others stretching back to antiquity, is in fact only apparent, a misunderstanding arising from a
misconception of the meaning of              .57 The word, she argues, does not mean ‘beyond
reproach’  in  the  general  or  more  narrowly ethical  sense,  but  refers  primarily  to  physical
excellence, and so can be most often translated as ‘beautiful’.58 This is a meaning she finds as
appropriate  to  Aigisthos  as  to  the  others  to  whom  the  word  is  applied.  She  readily
acknowledges that ‘Homeric epithets are not ordinarily chosen for their special relevance to
the immediate context’, but she argues vigorously against Parry’s notion of an indifference on
the part of singer or hearer.59 And the debate has continued.60
55 . Even Odysseus’ favored technique of exploiting the gap between appearance and 
reality has a certain kinship with Lykourgos’ victory over the ‘mace-man’. In the apparent 
contradiction between this epithet and its context there is a similar play between surface and 
depth: Areithoos seems not to be a ‘mace-man’ at this particular moment, but he is one in a 
truer and deeper sense.
56 . Noting that             ,  ‘which is used in Homer for 24 heroes, seems to fit 23 of them 
perfectly well, but raises a question in the case of the twenty-fourth’—Aigisthos—M. Parry 
(1971), 151, writes: ‘if [Homer] used the epithet                  for Aegisthus with so little 
thought for the character of that villain, there is no reason to suppose he took any more 
thought for the character of Odysseus, of Alcinous, or of that Gorgythion who likewise enters 
the poem only to lose his life at the hands of Teucer’.
57 . A. A. Parry (1973). Ebeling (1885), s.v.             , surveys discussions of the problem
from antiquity to his contemporaries.
58 . A. A. Parry (1973), 148. As she notes on p. 156, Parry was anticipated in this 
conclusion by Hoffmann (1914). Parry rejects the traditional etymology deriving              
from           , finding for this etymology ‘absolutely no convincing evidence in support, and 
considerable evidence against’ (159); but cf. Chantraine (2009), s.v.             , and 
Lowenstam (1981), 45. 
59 . A. A. Parry (1973), 3; on the notion of ‘indifference’, see p. 161. As pointed out by 
Combellack (1977), 171, in spite of her acknowledgement that epithets are often used without
regard for the specific context, Parry often argues as though some special relevance should be 
expected.
60 . See, e.g., Lowenstam (1981), 44-45, Combellack (1982), Heubeck (1987), 38-41. 
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My interpretation will, in a sense, chart a middle way between Milman Parry and Anne
Amory Parry by holding that an incongruous or ‘illogical’ epithet has been used deliberately
in order to suggest a link between Aigisthos and Odysseus that might otherwise be obscured
by the way that the story of Agamemnon’s homecoming is generally deployed in the Odyssey.
The epithet is not, then, used ‘indifferently’, although, I argue, the intentional incongruity of
Odyssey 1.29 reflects the real possibility that a formulaic style will occasionally give rise to
such ‘indifferent’  usages.  My claim is that,  in a manner similar to what we have seen in
connection with the Iliad’s ‘narrow roads’, the poetry is here harnessing a feature of its style
self-consciously—not, as in the Iliad, in order to validate the essential meaningfulness of its
formulaic language, but, on the contrary, so as to embrace the apparent contradiction as a sign
of the ethical complexity of the actions the poem depicts. In other words, the propensity of a
formulaic style to produce an occasional mismatch between an epithet and its context is here
being put forward as an index of the Odyssean ethic, an ethic that, as I have argued, demands
the cultivation of ambiguity in order to accommodate its inherent ambivalence.
References to the story of Agamemnon’s murder by Aigisthos (not by Klytaimnestre, as
Aiskhylos has it)  recur  throughout  the  Odyssey;  almost  always some direct  connection is
made to the ongoing story of Odysseus’ return. Telemakhos is advised by Athene/Mentes to
take Orestes as his model in putting an end to the Suitors’ depredations (Od. 1.298-302);
Nestor uses the story to warn Telemakhos not to stay too long away from home (3.313-16). In
the  Underworld,  Agamemnon  cites  his  own  experiences  as  a  cautionary  example  for
Odysseus,  who  must  not,  he  urges,  declare  himself  openly  on  Ithaca  (11.441-56).  On
Agamemnon’s view, what happened to him is justification for the adoption of what I have
termed the ‘Odyssean’ ethic even in relation to Penelope: ‘speak not to her all that you have
in mind’, he advises, ‘but say one thing and let another be hidden’ (       ’                             
                      ,         ’                 ,  /                                   ,                                                    ,
11.442-3). Odysseus himself senses that he might have suffered Agamemnon’s fate, if not for
the warning given him by Athene (13.383-85). Agamemnon’s reappearance in the Second
Nekyia caps this series of references: the dead man draws a pointed contrast between the
treachery of his own wife and Penelope’s virtue (24.194-202).
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Each of these examples relies on an obvious set of parallels: Agamemnon corresponds to
Odysseus, Orestes to Telemakhos, Klytaimnestre to Penelope, and Aigisthos to the Suitors.
But the way in which the stories of Agamemnon and Odysseus ultimately diverge opens up
the possibility of reconfiguring these parallels, at least in one respect. For Odysseus achieves
his  homecoming  by  following  the  example  not  of  Agamemnon  but  of  Aigisthos.  Like
Aigisthos—whose most frequent epithet,                    (‘of deceitful           ’), identifies him as a
figure of            —Odysseus slaughters unsuspecting men at a feast.61 And as in the case of
Aigisthos, many of the men he kills ought to be his             (‘near-and-dear ones’); some are
possibly even kinsmen. Odysseus has evidently taken Agamemnon’s example to heart and
decided  that  the  best  way  to  apply  its  lesson  is  to  reconfigure  his  relationship  to  the
paradigm.62 This reconfiguration is suggested also in the Second Nekyia by the tale of the
suitor Amphimedon, who recounts the Suitors’ story from their perspective. In his telling,
Odysseus bears a noticeable resemblance to Agamemnon’s treacherous cousin: he conspires
with Penelope to bring about the Suitors’ destruction (Od. 24.167); Penelope, for her part,
looks  more  and  more  like  Klytaimnestre.63 In  this  way  the  Odyssey briefly permits  an
alternative view of Odysseus’ return to come to the fore, but quickly forces it again into the
background by giving the last word to Agamemnon. The sharp distinction he makes between
Penelope’s  virtue—underscored  by  the  epithet               (24.194)—and  Klytaimnestre’s
wickedness not only encourages us to forget whatever shadows may be cast over Penelope’s
61 . Aigisthos                   : Od. 1.300, 3.198, 3.250, 3.308, 4.525. The only other figure to 
receive this epithet is—predictably—Klytaimnestre (11.422). It is significant that Aigisthos is 
explicitly said to have trapped Agamemnon by means of a            (4.531): he is, in other 
words, a practitioner of an Odyssean mode of action.
62 . There is a striking similarity here to the way that Akhilleus applies the tale of 
Meleagros to his situation in the Iliad. Phoinix offers the example of Meleagros to Akhilleus 
in Iliad 9 as a cautionary tale, warning him, as Agamemnon warns Odysseus, not to follow 
the example. Akhilleus responds by modeling his actions on the tale in an unexpected way: he
resolves to refrain from fighting until the battle reaches his own tent. Odysseus similarly 
applies the lesson by modeling his actions on the paradigm in an unexpected way. 
63 . Cf. Danek (1998), 481-2. Note the emphasis on Penelope’s            (‘deceit’) at Od. 
24.128 (where she is presented as actively plotting death for the Suitors) and 141, and cf. 
11.422 and 439 (with reference to Klytaimnestre’s           ). To some, Amphimedon’s account 
has suggested the existence of an alternative version of the story, in which Odysseus and 
Penelope do conspire against the Suitors: see Kirk (1962), 245-47, and Austin (1975) 219, 
with n25. Others sense a kind of implicit conspiracy based on Penelope’s intuition that the 
beggar is Odysseus and entered into when Penelope proposes the contest of the bow in Book 
19: see Amory (1963) and Austin (1975), 205-38 (esp. pp. 230-31). 
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reputation  by  Amphimedon’s  account;  it  also  distracts  us  from  Odysseus  and  from  the
unsettling problem of the violence he perpetrates on Ithaca. 
This violence is, of course, the great scandal of the Odyssey, and the poem goes to some
lengths in order to excuse it.64 The story of the Companions, for example, seems framed in
such a way as to license the destruction of the Suitors. In the proem, the narrator asserts that
the Companions perished because of their own                       (‘wickedness’) in slaughtering
the cattle of Helios, in spite of Odysseus’ best efforts to save them from destruction (Od. 1.6-
9).  The                   (‘wicked deeds’)  of  which  the  Suitors  are so often  accused similarly
consist above all in the slaughter of animals to which they have no right.65 The theodicy put
forward at the beginning of the poem by Zeus, who asserts that humans suffer evils ‘beyond
their share’ because of their own                      (1.32-4)—Aigisthos being his prime example
—provides a divine endorsement for the view that the fates that befall the Companions and
the Suitors are entirely their own fault.
And yet there are good reasons to feel that, at least in the case of the Companions, Zeus’
theodicy  and  the  frame  provided  by  the  narrator  in  the  proem  obscure  some  significant
nuances.66 The Companions have no good choices: trapped on Thrinakie, they are faced with
the alternatives of either starving to death or eating the forbidden cattle. Their failure to do
what is ‘right’ seems to be a clear case of ‘moral luck’; one wonders if such a failure is fairly
described as a matter of                     .67 Moreover, there are indications that Odysseus is not
entirely free of responsibility for the Companions’ fate. After he has neutralized the threat
posed by Kirke, Odysseus returns to those he has left behind at the ship to invite them to join
64 . On this central ethical problem, and the way it is handled obliquely by the poem, see 
Nagler (1990). On p. 347, Nagler identifies a hermeneutic principle that seems eminently 
relevant to my interpretation of Od. 1.29: ‘oddities in the text often draw oblique but 
unmistakable attention to ethical contradictions’. (In a footnote, Nagler adds, without further 
development, that the story of Aigisthos and Agamemnon ‘stands in very much the same 
oblique relationship’ to the killing of the Suitors as does that of the Companions, which is 
Nagler’s primary object of interest in this article.)
65 . The Suitors’                  /                     : Od. 3.207, 16.86, 16.93, 17.588, 18.143, 
20.170, 20.370, 21.146, 22.47, 22.317, 22.416, 23.67, 24.282, 24.352, 24.458.
66 . On the question of ‘framing’ and its implications for judgments about the ethics of 
Odysseus’ actions, see now Burgess (2014).
67 . For application of the concept of ‘moral luck’ to a variety of Greek literary and 
philosophical texts, see Nussbaum (2001 [1986]). 
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the others in Kirke’s house. Eurylokhos, suspecting a trap, urges them not to go, claiming that
Odysseus is once again leading his men to their destruction, as he did when he brought them
to Polyphemos’ cave.  He even goes so far as to level the charge of                       against
Odysseus  himself  (                                                                               [‘they,  too,  perished
because of this man’s                     ] ,  Od. 10.437).68 This accusation, which neatly reverses the
narrator’s characterization of the story in the proem, is a highly compressed version of the
kind  of  alternative  history  provided  by Amphimedon  in  the  Second  Nekyia.69 Odysseus’
response is to consider, and apparently intend, violently suppressing this subversive voice by
killing  Eurylokhos—in  fact,  he  contemplates  beheading  him—‘even  though  he  was  an
especially close kinsman’ (                                                     , 10.441). (He is dissuaded from
doing so by the other Companions.)  Eurylokhos will  later be the one who convinces  the
Companions to slaughter Helios’ cattle. While he cannot be said to be wholly innocent in this
regard, it is clear that, on Thrinakie as on Kirke’s island, he has the best interests of the
Companions  at  heart.  And  his  charge  against  Odysseus  carries  some  weight.  Odysseus’
willingness to kill him, a kinsman, would only seem to demonstrate that Odysseus, too, can
legitimately be accused of                     .70 
There are, then, reasons to doubt whether the Companions bear sole responsibility for their
eventual destruction. And if on close inspection small cracks appear in the ethical framework
erected by the narrator (and endorsed by Zeus) at  the beginning of the poem, the  whole
structure  that  supports  Odysseus’  killing  of  the  Suitors  is  in  danger  of  collapsing.  The
68 . It is no coincidence that Eurylokhos singles out the Polyphemos episode. As many 
have noted, the actions of Odysseus and his men in Polyphemos’ cave bear a number of 
similarities to those of the Suitors on Ithaca. Odysseus is liable to the charge of                      
to the extent that his actions converge with those of the Suitors.
69 . Cf. Nagler (1990), 346, who calls Eurylokhos’ accusation ‘a bitingly sarcastic 
revision of the proem’s language’. Nagler connects Eurylokhos’ charge to that of Eupeithes, 
father of Antinoos, at Od. 24.426-39. Eupeithes’ is another of the poem’s embedded 
alternative voices. On Eupeithes and Eurylokhos, see also Burgess (2014), 346-7, who 
comments, ‘The poem in such passages goes out of its way to air anti-Odyssean charges that 
are essentially irrefutable’.
70 . It is notable that the Odyssey assigns to Odysseus’ chief antagonist among the 
Companions a name (Eury-lokhos, ‘he of the wide           ’) that aligns him with Odysseus’ 
own mode of action. Odysseus’ chief antagonist among the Suitors, Antinoos, is likewise an 
exponent of           :  he proposes and leads the expedition to ambush Telemakhos, which is 
many times referred to as a            (Od. 4.670 and 847, 13.425, 14.181, etc.).
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Mnesterophonia proves that Odysseus’ thoughts of killing a kinsman were no idle fantasy:
here is a man whose violence is readily directed against those who ought to be            .  Of
course, Odysseus has suffered a grave offense, and his response is, to an extent, justified. One
cannot  help  wondering,  however,  whether  things  might  not  more  justly  have  turned  out
otherwise.
These reflections bring me back to ‘blameless’ Aigisthos. It can be said that he, too, has
been gravely offended, and that his actions against a kinsman are, to an extent, justified. This
argument was put forward by Frederick Combellack in an article that attempts to explain the
apparent  incongruity  of  Od. 1.29  in  terms  of  cultural  norms:  by  killing  Agamemnon,
Aigisthos fulfilled his society’s expectation that he should exact vengeance for the crimes of
Atreus;  by  this  very  act  he  set  himself  beyond  reproach.71 This  seems  like  an  adequate
description of what may reasonably be presumed to have been Aigisthos’ own perspective on
his actions. And if the poem seems elsewhere to condemn those actions, we might be tempted
to see in the                   of 1.29 an instance of what Don Fowler famously called ‘deviant
focalisation’: in this incongruous epithet the poem encapsulates an alternative point of view
on controversial events, much as it does by permitting Amphimedon and Eurylokhos to voice
their perspectives.72
Combellack’s argument relies in part on his earlier refutation of Amory Parry’s claim that
            , as applied to Aigisthos, means nothing more than ‘handsome’.73 This refutation is,
in my view, correct, but one does not need to accept or reject any specific interpretation of the
meaning of              in order to perceive that the occurrence of the word at Od. 1.29 forges a
link between Aigisthos and Odysseus that unsettles the poem’s ethical framework. The word
             occurs a total of fifty times in the Odyssey. The person to whom the epithet is most
frequently applied is (unsurprisingly) Odysseus, by a wide margin: he receives the epithet ten
71 . Combellack (1982). In an earlier review of A. A. Parry (1973), Combellack had 
declared himself in favor of the view that                                     is simply ‘a lazy use of the 
formulary style’ ([1977], 168). In the later article, he readily admits that this explanation ‘may
be right’ ([1982], 364).
72 . Fowler (1990). Note that the metrically equivalent epithet                    (‘cowardly’), 
applied to Aigisthos at Od. 3.310, might easily have been used at 1.29.
73 . Combellack (1977).
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times, or fourteen, if we include the use of the word in reference to certain of his attributes.74
Otherwise,              is used no more than three times in connection with any given referent.75
The association of the word with Odysseus is especially pronounced in the second half of the
poem: out of a total of twenty-four occurrences, nine are in direct reference to Odysseus, and
two more to one of his attributes. Four of these belong to the same recurring, and highly
marked, block of lines: an oath-taking formula repeatedly used by the disguised Odysseus to
predict his return and the slaughter of the Suitors.76 At the very least, then, one can say that
the  description  of  Aigisthos  as               fosters  an  association  with  Odysseus  that  runs
counter to the way in which the story of Agamemnon’s downfall is generally connected to
Odysseus’ return. (Agamemnon is never so called.) There is no need to accept Combellack’s
defense of the epithet in order to see that Aigisthos, like Odysseus, is attempting to return to
his ancestral home and to recover property of which he has been deprived. It is surely no
accident  that  the  first  narrative  move  after  the  proem is  prompted  by  Zeus’  thinking  of
‘blameless Aigisthos’. Athene’s reply to Zeus (1.45-62) suggests a contrast between Aigisthos
and Odysseus—albeit in strikingly ambiguous terms.77 But the fact that it is the recollection of
Aigisthos that sets Odysseus’ story in motion suggests that these two have more in common
than may at first appear.
74 .              in reference to Odysseus: Od. 2.225, 14.159, 16.100, 17.156, 19.304, 
19.456, 20.209, 20.231, 21.99, 21.325; cf. 9.414 (Odysseus’           ); 10.50, 16.237 (his          
[‘heart’]); and 14.508 (the tale [          ] he recounts for Eumaios). An additional two 
occurrences, which I have not included in my count of those that refer to Odysseus or his 
attributes, refer to the physical structure of his house (22.442, 22.459).
75 .              is used three times of Akhilleus (Od. 11.470, 11.551, 24.18), Antilokhos 
(4.187, 11.468, 24.16), and Penelope (13.42, 15.15, 24.194). 
76 . The repeated lines are:                                                                             /              ’  
                               ,                      (‘Let Zeus first of all be witness, and the gods’ table of 
hospitality, / and the hearth of              Odysseus, to which I have come’). See Od. 14.158-9, 
17.155-6, 19.302-3, 20.230-1.
77 . Athene does not directly contrast the two; she states that Aigisthos deserved his fate, 
and then laments the situation of Odysseus, accuses Zeus of having forgotten the sacrifices the
latter offered at Troy, and asks Zeus why he is angry with him. The question is presumably 
rhetorical, but the famous paronomasia with which it is posed (                                       [‘why
are you now so angry with him’, Od. 1.62], where the verb is clearly meant to be connected to
Odysseus’ name) may prompt us to wonder whether Zeus has some reason to be angry. In any
case, the most striking thing about Athene’s reply is that her remarks leave open the question 
of whether the charge of                      can be leveled against Odysseus.
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I have argued for a range of connections between Aigisthos and Odysseus. Individually and
collectively,  these connections work to  undermine the positive terms in which Odysseus’
actions vis-à-vis the Companions and the Suitors are generally represented. They suggest a
degree of ambiguity that is not evident in the ethical framework set up by the proem and
Zeus’  theodicy.  The  Companions  and  the  Suitors  undoubtedly  bring  on  their  destruction
themselves, but Odysseus’ role in their demise is far from being unquestionably praiseworthy.
There is much to admire in Odysseus’ actions, but much, too, to feel uncertain about. In this
respect, the Odysseus of the Odyssey is very much like the Odysseus of the Iliad’s Doloneia.
A reluctance either to praise him or to blame him—a reluctance voiced by Odysseus himself
in the Iliad—seems in fact to be the appropriate response to a practitioner of a mode of action
that involves ethical compromises and even contradictions.
The  incongruous  epithet               at  Od. 1.29  is,  I  have  suggested,  a  token  of  the
connections between Aigisthos and Odysseus. Its apparent inappropriateness functions also as
a token of the ethical contradictions those connections imply. It is, in short, an index of the
‘Odyssean’ ethic. More than that, it is itself an instance of the ‘Odyssean’ ethic in practice, an
example of the cultivation of ambiguity as the only adequate means of representing Odyssean
action.  This interpretation implies not only that  the epithet  is  appropriate by virtue of its
inappropriateness, but also that it has been deliberately selected. I hasten to add that what has
been selected is nothing more than a traditional feature of the oral formulaic style, which
occasionally gives rise to an epithet that appears to be in conflict with its context. At Od. 1.29
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this traditional feature has been self-consciously exploited in order to encapsulate the poetics
of an epic that celebrates an ethically complex figure.78
A few brief  remarks  by  way  of  summary  and  conclusion.  I  have  argued  that  we  can
discover in both the Iliad and the Odyssey an awareness of a distinctive characteristic of an
oral formulaic style. Both poems recognize the possibility that their formulas will be used in
contexts to which they are not obviously appropriate.  Parry argued that such contextually
inappropriate uses of formulaic language are an indication of an ‘indifference’ on the part of
performers and their audiences. There is a great deal of truth in this explanation (although I
would prefer not to speak of ‘indifference’): at least at the level of the individual word, a
formulaic style that has evolved to meet the needs of oral performance must be able to tolerate
a certain looseness of fit with the broader context. But the users of such a style and their
audiences must nevertheless remain committed to its overall adequacy as a communicative
medium. Such a commitment is discernible in the passages I have examined, in which an
awareness of a lack of fit between epithet and context is coupled with an effort to underscore
the meaningfulness of the epithet—or, in the case of Od. 1.29, of the very lack of fit itself. 
In  their  efforts  to  harness  and make meaningful  the propensity  of  a  formulaic  style  to
generate contextual incongruities, the Iliad and Odyssey adopt divergent attitudes—at least in
the examples considered here. The Iliad affirms that, in spite of any apparent contradiction, its
words fundamentally mean what they say. Like Akhilleus himself, the poem promotes a view
of  (poetic)  language  as  a  system  of                       ,  words  of  immutable  meaning.  The
78 . ‘Blameless Aigisthos’ is only a single example, and so an insufficient basis for 
constructing a global understanding of Odyssean poetics. I believe, however, that the example
is emblematic of an attitude toward language that can be traced throughout the poem. The 
Odyssey is, after all, a narrative in which direct disclosure can have disastrous consequences, 
as Odysseus discovers after revealing his identity to Polyphemos. To take another example, 
one might find in the phrase                         (‘glorious swineherd’)—another of the ‘illogical’ 
uses of epithets singled out by Parry ([1971], 151)—an indicator of ethical complexity similar
to the one for which I have argued above. The epithet itself is fully validated by the narrative, 
which shows Eumaios to be valiant and courageous. Its juxtaposition with a marker of low 
social status, however, unsettles any easy assumptions about the ways in which ethical 
qualities map onto social class. We might say that it unsettles social class as a semiotic 
system. Ithaca is a world in which princely men like the Suitors turn out to be worthless, and 
slaves (and beggars) turn out to be heroes. (For a slightly different interpretation of the 
epithet, see Thalmann [1998], 90.)
33
Odyssey, by contrast,  embraces contradiction as a way of capturing all sides of its central
hero’s complex character, and as an expression of the Odyssean principle of ‘declaring one
thing and concealing another in one’s heart’. Its words are                   , capable of pointing
an  attentive  listener  or  reader  in  a  variety  of  directions.  Perhaps  the  most  interesting
consequence of this difference is that the rhapsode performing the Iliad or the Odyssey comes
to adopt the ethical position of the hero whose deeds he celebrates.
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